 "A well known battle as seen from the other side" | 2009-05-05 |
| - Reviewed By Graves from Pennsylvania |
Written in the early 1950's this book gives a fascinating insight into the mindset of the Japanese Navy from the early days of World War 2 through their devastating defeat at Midway.
For those who do not recognize the name of the main author, Mitsuo Fuchida, he was the Imperial Navy's strike leader, in the American terms the Combat Air Commander, for the First Carrier Strike Force. He was the man who led the attack on Pearl Harbor and was the one who sent back the coded message "Tora! Tora! Tora!" Until he was wounded at Midway when his ship was sunk under him he led the strikes on Ceylon and viewed the planning of the attack on Midway Island, with an unenviable front row seat for the American counter attack. After Midway he was attached to staff positions and was part of the committee that investigated the defeat at Midway, so clearly he was the man who knew what was going on.
Fuchida looks most closely at where things went wrong at Midway. The Japanese navy was run on the idea they would be outnumbered in battle but would win through superior quality over their enemies' superior numbers. At Midway however they had a vast level of numerical superiority but by the end they had been decisively defeated by a much smaller enemy and to all intents and purposes, had lost the war.
In this age Japanese culture seems to be either extreme pacifists who declare all military evil or right wing ultra nationalists who still say they waged a justified and defensive war. Fuchida brilliantly straddles this gap.
Without using it to justify the war he explains the Japanese military mindset which led to the war and how they viewed the naval arms race of the 1930's. At the same time he points out how the Japanese army and navy were not communicating with each other and this led to the different services developing widely different strategies and policies that became so set in stone that they were unable to change even as it became obvious they were badly flawed.
Fuchida relates from the Japanese side an eye witness view of the attack on Pearl Harbor and briefly addresses the various questions that came up at that time such as why there was no invasion of the Hawaiian Islands or no further air strikes on the bases there. From there he follows the growing sense of frustration by the carrier crews on various raids that they were not properly employed by the navy.
Beyond detailing the actual battle of Midway, whose various phases have been well documented, Fuchida's book covers the internal politics of the Japanese navy and the internal conflicts it suffered with as different factions debated even if Midway should be attacked.
If I have one serious complaint, and it could have been corrected by the publisher, it is that there is in general a lack of maps detailing where any of the actions take place. A few charts show how ships in the fleet twisted and turned under attacked but other wise the reader is left to wonder where any of the sites named are in relation to anything else. For example there is a map on page 131 of the area around New Zeeland, but nothing on other areas and this is 70 pages after detailing the actions in those waters.
Overall however this is an outstanding book showing the war from a quarter little is heard from as far too many senior Japanese officers did not survive the war or the following trials. Written by a professional who understands not all his readers will be professionals Fuchida keeps his prose and technical jargon under control. And while he may wave the flag a little or get a few details wrong, like the names of ships bombed or the type of allied planes who attacked his ships, the editor's corrections make sure the very few factual errors are corrected and the reader is left with an amazing insight into the mind of the Imperial Navy as it went to its doom only 6 months after its most outstanding victory.
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 "Midway - The Japanese Account" | 2009-04-27 |
| - Reviewed By An Amazon User |
Midway as told by Fuchida and Okumiya is an interesting account on the turn of the battle in the pacific. Fuchida was one of the senior officers during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Being an important part of the prolog to the battle of Midway he tells the story of this epic attack from the view of the attacker.
Unlike Germany and other axis powers very little firsthand information is available from the Japanese own records. This book is one of the most important sources of information narrated and told by the Japanese themselves. The book also gives an overview of the nature of the Japanese and why Japan never could have won the war. I found it interesting to read about the discussions inside the Japanese Navy General Staff that ultimately led to the outbreak of the war. There are some important lessons to be learned here, also transferable to daily life and interaction.
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 "Self-Serving Revisionist History" | 2009-04-08 |
| - Reviewed By An Amazon User |
The winner always writes history - right? In the case of the Battle of Midway, Mitsuo Fuchida's "The Battle That Doomed Japan" served as basically the only source material for Western historians of the battle for 50 years. Too bad it's just plain wrong - since his death in 1976, this book was essentially discredited in Japan, and recent findings have proven it as self-serving revisionism.
Fuchida's distortions are numerous and probably won't be caught by the majority of readers. He implies that the Aleutians invasion was a diversionary attack, when it was really a secondary operation tacked onto the Midway operation. He ridicules Nagumo for failing to implement a two-phase aerial search, a strategy not employed by the Japanese until more than a year later.
The most blatant revisionism, however, lies in Fuchida's distortion and simplification of the events of the morning of June 4, 1942. Recent research shows that the Japanese were still launching and recovering Combat Air Patrol fighters when the fatal dive bomber attack occurred, while Fuchida has their carriers just minutes away from launching a massive counterattack. WWII carriers couldn't recover aircraft while spotting an air strike on deck, something that Fuchida hoped we'd ignore and something that even the most scrupulous naval historians seemed to have ignored.
While this book might be short and fairly easy to read, it's undeniably long-in-the-tooth and riddled with intentional manipulations of fact. Even if he was there, there's no denying that Fuchida lied about what happened at the Battle of Midway. His conclusion that Japan lost the battle due to "Victory Disease" is a self-serving one that ignores that fact that the IJN shunned basic concepts such as damage control and anti-aircraft gunnery for years. For a better study of Japan's defeat at Midway, read "Shattered Sword," which debunks all of the myths put forth in this book. |
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| "View of Midway from 'other side of the hill'" | 2008-07-15 |
| - Reviewed By Karun Mukherji from Calicut,, India |
Battle of Midway is often considered the turning point of Pacific war. This book co authored by two Japanese participants of the battle must be considered a naval classic.
It may look slightly outdated by modern standards . But core facts need no revision. Certain aspects ,however, demand elaboration . For instance, role played by intelligence in deciding the outcome of battle. US Navy was privy to Japanese plans on Midway thanks to its ability to read Japanese naval ciphers. Being forewarned is almost like forearmed. Consequently, Americans frustrated Japanese bid to seize Midway and push defense perimeter farther west. Authors have acknowledged the contribution of intelligence to American victory. However documentation to this effect is minimal.
The important thing is the phenomenal luck enjoyed by Americans. Lt. Cdr Wade McClusky was leading 33 Dauntless dive-bombers from USS Enterprise in a hunt for Japanese fleet..Where he expected to find enemy fleet ,he found nothing. Soon his planes would have to return because fuel was running low. But McClusky took a risk and upon an hunch decided to search farther west. This gamble paid off. Little later he saw the wake of a Japanese destroyer and decided to follow it. The enemy fleet hove into view. American dive-bombers swooped down to attack . The time 10.25 am June 4, 1942 and rest is history.
McClusky strike could not have come at a better moment. Nearly 100 planes crammed on Japanese carriers preparing for an assault on US fleet. All were loaded with high explosives and high- octane fuel. Bombs were loosely stacked on hangar decks and tiniest spark could turn them into a blazing inferno. However principal credit for American victory should go to torpedo-bomber pilots. It was they who first found Japanese carriers . Dive- bombers capitalized on the sacrifice of brave torpedo-bomber pilots from carrier USS Yorktown . Japanese combat air patrols drawn down to sea level while engaged in repelling latter's assaults lacked sufficient time to regain altitude for intercepting the onrush of dive-bombers.
These are some interesting facts conspicuously absent in this book. To me, MI plan resembled a huge Cannae type manoeuvre at sea. Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo while engaged in action with US fleet will facilitate Admiral Yamamoto's main body to sneak from behind and strike at the American flank. Soon they would be joined by Rear Admiral Kakuji Kakuta's Second Air Fleet who will descend upon American rear returning from operations in Aleutian island chain. The result would be annihilation of US pacific Fleet.
Unfortunately for Japanese the battle did not unfold in this manner . MI plan was exceedingly complex based on false assumptions. Japanese anticipated American reaction only after they neutralized Midway. But sudden appearance of American fleet derailed their plans. Failure of Japanese naval planners to foresee such a contingency was deplorable. This speaks volumes of Tokyo's pre battle reconnaissance ,intelligence gathering capabilities inadequacy of which prevented Adm Nagumo from exploiting his victory at Pearl Harbor.
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 "Mitsuo Fuchida was a liar..." | 2006-09-03 |
| - Reviewed By David P. Graf from Chatham, IL USA |
As a Navy brat who grew up in the postwar era, Midway was a big deal. Of course, I read and enjoyed Fuchida's book. However, I recently finished reading "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway" by Jonathan Parshall. In this book, it's clearly demonstrated that Fuchida did more than shade the truth. He lied in such a way to push blame upon others for Japan's defeat at Midway. For example, Fuchida makes the claim that the Japanese were getting ready to launch their strike just at the time the American SBDs dive bombed their carriers. Parshall shows how that was impossible given both Japanese carrier practice and the logs of flight activity. Sadly, Fuchida's book has enjoyed an unwarranted popularily due to our ignorance of Japanese documents and our lack of desire to question something that fits right into our own prejudices.
The Japanese historians consider Fuchida to be a liar. It's time that we do the same. |
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| "One of the best works on the Battle of Midway" | 2006-09-02 |
| - Reviewed By An Amazon User |
| I first read this account of the battle of Midway almost fourty years ago. As an avid student of World War II, I have read many books dealing with this battle, but this is the best in telling the Japanese side of the battle. It gives the American reader an account of the battle from the Japanese viewpoing, with emphasis on the fatal minutes when the Japanese fighters were wave-hopping after the last of the torpedo planes, leaving the sky above open to the three squadrons of American dive bombers to change the course of the battle and the war itself. I have read many versions of this battle from the American viewpoing, but this is still the best coming from the Japanese viewpoint. I have had a copy of this work in my library since I first read it back in the late sixties, and still consider it one of the best. |
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