I had heard a lot about this book, and was thrilled when I finally found it in paperback. I am a Political Science student in college, and am in my third year of Statistics courses. I have read many an intense academic study from a peer-reviewed journal on what seems to be a boring topic, until correctly applied statistics reveal an interesting twist.
This book was a complete and utter let-down.
There's no math in this book. There's no statistics, either. And that is not a good thing in a book that claims to be about economics. They don't even bother trying to explain any statistics, and what they do, the authors incorrectly apply. I don't feel like going into specifics, but you can read the other reviews here: they assume that correlation implies causation, they don't control, they don't consider alternatives. It's just plain bad work, and is often painfully wrong.
As a Poli Sci major, I've taken many courses on Criminal Justice, and the section on abortion in this book just made me want to scream. This is the first section, and I actually had to set the book down and stop reading. Actual studies of crime from this time period have shown that while public perception of crime increased, the actual crime rates remained relatively stable proportional to the population. It was more of a media problem than an actual problem. In addition, the biggest problem with low-income minority mothers is that they keep their children. They can't afford or lack the resources to get abortions. This in fact perpetuates the cycle of poverty and increases crime - low-income minority MOTHERS are arguably the biggest problem the criminal justice system faces. The people Americans think are (or should) be getting abortions aren't. Beyond that, there are a million much more plausible and truthful conclusions to be made about the ties between abortions (or the lack thereof) and crime (or the lack thereof). But Levitt and Dubner never pause to give these the time of day.
There's a million other things wrong with that entire section, and so on, throughout every section of the book. And I do mean EVERY SECTION OF THE BOOK. Which is why I'm keeping this short: because if I wanted to, I'd go through every page of this damn thing and explain why it's wrong.
It's shoddily done, poorly explained, and written solely for the lowest common denominator: the person who wouldn't know enough about statistics or the topics at hand to realize the glaring mistakes. It's garbage.
The first thing you learn in statistics is that you can take the data and twist it to say whatever you want. Levitt and Dubner have taken it, leaped to conclusions, and dumbed down the data to mean one thing: a blockbuster for them, and nothing of substance for the readers of America.
If you're interested in statistics, take your time to go read the real thing. I promise you, it is not that hard. You'd be surprised to know how easy it really is to read the actual studies, and it's so worthwhile. Don't waste your money on this book.
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Freakonomics, by Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner is an entertaining book that will also teach you a thing or two about the world and the reasons behind many intriguing aspects of society. The book tries to explain different aspects of how and why people behave the way they do and also tries to explain different societal trends, such as "name cycles" and crime rates. The book places a lot of emphasis on crime rates and their relationship to legalized abortion, sometimes too much emphasis. Too much of the book's pages are dedicated to this topic. Given the fact that a lot of reviewers have praised this book, and that it has had a recent surge in popularity, I had my expectations. I wanted to be "dazzled" (like it says on the back cover). How was it? The book makes a significant number of good (and not so good) points, but it so just happens that I already knew, had heard of, or had figured out most of them through my life experience. As a result, unfortunately, I was left undazzled. I do however, believe that it is truly a good book. It is both, insightful and entertaining, one of my favorite combinations.
My two favorite chapters were chapter one and chapter three. I liked chapter one in part because of its variety of topics, but mostly because of Paul Feldman's story and experiences while running an "honor system" bagel business which he started from scratch. As somebody who is planning to start a business soon, I liked this entrepreneurial story and the way it was told. It did, however, seem too short for me since only part of the chapter pages are used on the subject. I liked it, I wanted it to be longer and to go into more detail. This chapter strengthened my already firm belief that Psychology, Economics, and Finance are intrinsically linked at their root. What is their root? The human participant and the choices he makes (or should make). Many economic models are based on the assumption of an always rational participant that also happens to posses perfect knowledge and understanding of the marketplace and the utility he derives from products. As you might guess, the models need refinement. It is here were Psychology can lend a helping hand. The models will ultimately loose simplicity, but they will gain accuracy. Paul Feldman's story is a highlight in the book and the insights that can be obtained from it, could, by themselves, be the subject of a different book. It could certainly fit nicely in a Social Psychology textbook.
Then there is chapter three. This chapter, especially pages 91 and 92, was my favorite part of the whole book. The chapter is quite entertaining and a couple of passages are just hilarious. This chapter explains why a drug dealer engages in high risk activities (Apparently a 25% chance of being killed during a four year period) for which he is seemingly not well compensated (less than 4 dollars an hour). How do the authors explain this seemingly irrational behavior? They compare a career in drug dealing to that of an actor, athlete, or musician. Most do not receive high economic compensation, but if you manage to climb up the ladder... The book even mentions that some people even paid fees just to have a chance of being considered for a position as "foot soldiers" for a gang. The explanation for the drug dealer's behavior was quite enlightening, but the main reason I like this chapter is because of its entertainment value.
I have to say, however, that the book did not convince me of some of the points it makes. For example, in chapter four Levitt argues that gun control laws have very little effect because a healthy black market for guns exists. To support his view, he cites a study done before the Brady Act (gun control). The study, he argues, showed that "only about one-fifth of the criminals had bought their guns through a licensed dealer" (p.132). My mental response to this was: That is 20 percent! Isn't that a big chunk? Also, another thing I didn't like in this chapter is that Levitt (or Dubner?) seems seriously biased towards his ideas. This can be easily seen when Levitt dismisses the Broken-Window Theory without sufficient evidence. While I agree with Levitt's theory, I don't think its fair to dismiss other valid ideas. Levitt does not mention any psychological studies done on the validity of the Broken-Window Theory. Levitt's implicit argument seems to be: I am obviously right. Therefore, they are obviously wrong. This is not always the case, especially with non-mutually-exclusive ideas.
Also, chapter two does a poor job in explaining the source of the Ku Klux Klan's power. Here, Levitt argues that the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) derived its power from information asymmetry and that Stetson Kennedy seriously damaged the clan by making secret clan information public. While I agree with this statement, I don't agree with the way it was presented and argued. In other words, there are stronger reasons behind the information asymmetry and its relationship to the clan's power than those given by the author's. The book seems to place too much value on passwords, codes, key-words, secret meetings, infiltration, etc... The book does not place enough emphasis on the idea that one of the main advantages the clan had over its enemies is that the clan members were mostly secret, often even between clan members (Think white masks). The outside world did not know who most of the clan members were. This was probably the main source of the clan's power, not passwords, secret meetings and hierarchy. Many psychological studies have shown that people will often do things they wouldn't otherwise do if they think they will remain anonymous. This explains to a great extent the clan's power, actions and why Stetson Kennedy's efforts impacted the clan the way they did. It also explains Paul Feldman's (bagel business from chapter one) collection differences between small and big businesses. Small businesses had lower default rates. Why was this the case? Psychology would tell us, just like Freakonomics, that the reason the small businesses had higher collection rates is that people in the smaller offices has a bigger perceived risk of being caught not paying for their bagels. The information given by Levitt seems to support this conclusion as well, but this conclusion is not reached when talking about the Ku Klux Klan. These two last points however, should not make you think that the book's claims are not well supported. Almost all of them seem clear and well supported. The book doesn't just list answers to intriguing questions, it gives evidence to support its various claims. Overall, this is a book that I would recommend and now I am waiting for the next installment from Levitt and Dubner, SuperFreakonomics!
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"Garbage."
"Good Ideas. Great insights. Good evidence."