Reviews Written By: A1NN8LGZ3GBJCHprovided by Amazon.com |
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 | Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam and the Future of America | |
 | "Confused Analysis, Unclear Message" | 2007-02-02 |
| While I did not read this book, I did attend a 1 1/2 hour lecture given by Scheuer at a local college. I found myself agreeing with the some of his conclusions, but found that he arrived at most of them for all the wrong reasons. I will give here a brief critique of his lecture. 1. Scheuer believes that militant Islam's grievances are valid (to some unspecified extent) and should be addressed. He suggested that the problems with Islamism stem in part from the Arab-Israeli conflict, but then, confusingly, explained that Islamic terror is a global phenomenon [true], citing as an example the Muslim terrorism against Thai Buddhists and the military coup there which recently transpired. Scheuer thinks the "clash of civilizations" would be mitigated if we ceased all support for Israel. Curiously, he thinks it would be desirable to let Israel pursue the harsh measures required to defeat terror without US intervention. But this is odd, coming from a man who thinks US support for Israel is one of the roots of the problem. Does he believe that US restraint of Israel is the problem, or does he think that US involvement with Israel, largely supportive, is the problem? In the lecture, Scheuer stated that America pussyfoots by trying to win "hearts and minds", and openly stated that militant Islam will require the same unambiguously decisive defeat that America inflicted on the Japanese. I don't entirely disagree with that conclusion, but then Scheuer criticizes Israel for being too harsh in its war against Hizballah. Scheuer accuses Israel of barbarously leveling buildings but ignores the thousands of Hizballah rockets that killed hundreds of Israelis. In other words, does Scheuer think that America was justified to exhort Israel to use "proportionate force" when dealing with Hizballah, or does he think Israel should have employed the same overwhelming force that he recommends the US employ in Iraq? Does he think that only the US is entitled to employ overwhelming force and that Israel alone should be prevented from doing so? Which is it? 2. Scheuer repeatedly made the analogy that Bin Laden is a modern incarnation of the Civil War's Stonewall Jackson. I find this fawning comparison to be ahistorical, morally equivalent, and almost offensive. Jackson was not a murderer. Jackson wore a uniform and actually led his men in battle. Jackson was simply a brilliant military commander, like many before and after him. Scheuer's analogy reminds me of a similar one by Yassir Arafat, who stated, "I am like George Washington". Patton was a brilliant tactical commander -- was he like Bin Laden, too? 3. Indeed, it seems that Scheuer ignores 1300 years of history. His analysis of global Islamic militancy starts, more or less, with Khomeini. While a case can be made (a difficult one) that Khomeini initiated a total change in the Islamic weltanschauung, this contention would require significant bolstering on Scheuer's part, given that Islamic conflict with the West hearkens back almost to its inception, and has been waged almost without respite ever since. It can be argued that our clash with Islam represents a discontinuous break from, say, the Ottoman clashes with Russia and Austria, or the Moor's conquest of Spain, or the Saracen invasion of Sicily, and so on -- but he does not provide that argument. Indeed, Scheuer's historiography, while glib and seductive, is rather amateurish and spotty. It doesn't seem to go further than his recommendation that America resuscitate the spirit of General Sherman -- a recommendation that, while not without its merits, is founded on a rather superficial historical comparison. 4. Scheuer's explanation for why (he assumes?) Bin Laden is alive was utterly unconvincing. "We would know if he was dead," he stated. When asked why Bin Laden has not seized the rich propaganda opportunity to taunt the West by making new video appearances, Scheuer asserted - incredibly - that Bin Laden does not desire to taunt the West. He contends, therefore, that Bin Laden does not relish propaganda opportunities. His is certainly an interesting theory, but not convincing in my view. 5. Scheuer characterized the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as "infantile". Scheuer fails to mention if there are any other conflicts around the world, or in history, that he regards as infantile. He apparently feels that calling the conflict "infantile" is helpful. Scheuer suffers from the disease of moral equivalency here, treating both sides as equally responsible for the conflict. Any recognition of Israel's peace overtures at the Camp David accords and at Oslo was absent. 6. Scheuer stated that no nation, including the US, has a "right" to exist. He did not explain this comment in greater detail, but by implication, he therefore believes that the last victor in a struggle is by definition, legitimate -- that is, that might makes right. 7. Scheuer dredges up the favorite bogeyman of the Left and of America-Last conservatives -- Neocons! He stated (and I quote) that "Neoconservatives manufactured the Islamic Caliphate." Given that the caliphate first appeared during 7-8th century Islamic conquest, I find his assertion hard to swallow. Love Neocons or hate them, it is hard to take Scheuer seriously when he makes comments so obviously absurd. In general, Scheuer claims that many of our current problems with Islamic militancy is our fault. He derides US foreign policy for supporting dictators, like Mubarak, but did not adequately address the alternative, in this case the Muslim Brotherhood. If not Mubarak, then what? Scheuer apparently believes that Muslims are justified in rioting around the world because of cartoons in a Danish newspaper. It is not clear how Scheuer would attack these difficulties -- should we stop publishing cartoons? Should there be censorship? Should we bow and scrape whenever Muslims are offended? 8. Scheuer neglects to mention that the US rescued Muslims in Kosovo, saved Shia and Kurds in Iraq, and helped Bin Laden's own Mujaheddin repulse the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and yet, somehow, asserts that we are still responsible for the (valid?) negative perception of the US among Muslims. He feels that terror will decrease if we take steps to make us more popular with terrorists. 9. Scheuer resigned from the CIA to protest the Bush Administration's handling of the War on Terror, or rather, its mishandling at the hands of the dreaded Neocons. But Scheuer does not explain why he opted not to resign under Clinton, who did not act to kill Bin Laden when he had the chance. Scheuer himself harshly condemns Clinton for that decision, but fails to explain why Clinton's errors did not merit a resignation but Bush's alleged errors do. This leads the listener to wonder if his resignation wasn't motivated by some mysterious personal reason. More to the point, if Scheuer has so much vitriol for the alleged mismanagement of the War on Terror by Neoconservatives, why does he also berate the Clinton administration for mismanagement -- an administration which did not contain Neoconservatives? 10. Scheuer derides the media's hand wringing and "whining" about the war, yet he himself, as the CBS "Terrorism Expert", seems part of the problem. I have not seen him forcefully take his own network to task (let alone the media as a whole) for glorifying failure, ignoring successes, and furthering its own demonstrably Leftist bias. 11. Scheuer decries President Bush and his alleged Neocon cabal for involving us in Iraq. Certainly, I would not argue his Presidency is free of mistakes. Yet Bush's decision was based on intelligence furnished not only by the CIA, but by the British MI5 and also French intelligence. If the intelligence made available to Bush was flawed, it seems unfair, in the absence of other details, to criticize the White House for its decision to go to war. Some of Michael Scheuer's recommendations seem correct -- use overwhelming force, cease support for dictators, or jettison Europe, for example. But he appears to arrive at them via a twisted path of factual omissions and contradictions. Scheuer seems to suffer from a type of analytical schizophrenia, or cognitive dissonance. On the one hand, he adopts the rather Leftist positions that we are responsible for Islamic antipathy toward us, that Israel is the problem, that we have inflamed the Muslim world, and that Iraq has created more terrorists. On the other, he regards US military actions as timid. Indeed, Scheuer's lecture left me not only dismayed by his apparently romantic attachment to Bin Laden as an anti-hero, but wondering, simply, whether Scheuer himself contributed to the ineffectiveness of the CIA during his tenure. Until Scheuer can answer these and other questions, I will refrain from spending time and money on his books. | ||
 | Natasha's Dance : A Cultural History of Russia | |
 | "Very well done" | 2006-11-29 |
| Figes has managed to write an engaging history that reads quickly, yet is rigorous and packed with information. The work elaborates beautifully on the Russian identity crisis between East and West, as well as the conflict between the peasantry and nobility. Particularly enjoyable is the coverage of the eastern peoples, such as the Tatars, and the culture of the peasantry. In addition, the author dwells on religion and spirituality -- the role of the Orthodox Church in Russian life, and its various divergent branches -- monastics, ascetics, Old Believers, holy fools and, of course, the mainstream church.
Figes explores many aspects of culture, including literature, music, dance, theatre, painting, and much more. The work isn't dry, however. Figes weaves together numerous intriguing tidbits and andecdotes, for example, the tragic life of Anna Akhmatova under the Soviets, or what it means to dine on the "Sheremetev account", or the private operas featuring divas of serf origin. It is astonishing that a topic so broad could be covered so competently in one volume. "Natasha's Dance" is a superb synthesis that promises a rewarding journey to the history-oriented reader. | ||
 | From Dawn to Decadence : 500 Years of Western Cultural Life 1500 to the Present | |
| "An epiphany" | 2006-11-25 |
| I must confess it was amusing to read the faint praise of multicultural critics on the inside cover, seeing that Barzun excoriates the same politically-correct elites that are in large part responsible for the decline in historical rigor. What is less amusing is that decline itself, and the decline of objectivity and reason in western society on the whole, just as we face new civilizational threats. If we have often wondered why so many historical works are unreadable, Barzun provides the answer. The targeting of history by ideologues has led to either revisionist trash or pedantic nitpicking by parochial scholars. There was a time, however, when history was read by the mainstream to the same extent as novels or other literature, where synthesis was placed at a premium, where sweeping scope was not frowned upon as naive. With "Dawn", Barzun provides just such a synthesis, and does so with consummate skill and prose so beautiful, the work should serve as a model for future endeavors of a similar stripe. As the work progresses, it emerges that Barzun is, above all, a teacher. Here is not only a cultural history that emphasizes unappreciated actors and themes, but an urgent recommendation for future exploration. The smart footnote style, inline cross-references and reading suggestions, as well as the callouts of notable quotes operate smoothly to enhance the clarity of ideas. Barzun has a knack for capturing what is interesting to readers and, moreover, for anticipating gaps in the reader's knowledge. Only through a lifetime of scholarship could a work of this depth and scope be successfully executed. In the end, one is left with a touch of sadness when the last page of "Dawn" is turned -- left, that is, with the poignant realization that Barzun is in his 90s and that he, along with other icons of his generation like Bernard Lewis, will leave shoes behind that today's second-rate revisionists and pedants cannot fill. In this respect, "Dawn" can at least be a monument to the vestiges of a once-great civilization, a lasting admonishment to declining standards even as our values, the "better angels of our nature", disappear. | ||
 | The Face of Battle | |
| "A classic" | 2006-11-23 |
| Keegan puts you on the scene at Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme. One of the earliest departures from the bird's eye, general's view, The Face of Battle captures the battles from a physical, sensory, even biological perspective. Keegan creates a model for historians to assess the ebb and flux of the battle by providing an almost socratic approach to combat inquiry. My personal favorite is the narration of Agincourt. In this battle, the author looks at the reality of whether bodies could pile up as high as they are reputed to have done along the line of contact. He examines the effectiveness of arrows and notes that at the range given the primary effect would have been to enrage the adversary's horses and not, as is often thought, to inflict casualties. Especially fascinating was the brutal crush of fellow soldiers pressing the forward ranks into the "funnel" created by the forest, which made anything other than forward movement nearly impossible. Similarly, he captures the mayhem created in the ranks by returning cavalry, after a failed charge. And let us not forget, it isn't very easy to relieve oneself in a full suit of plate, especially with dysentary! | ||
 | Napoleon and Wellington : The Battle of Waterloo--and the Great Commanders Who Fought It | |
 | "Lots of dirt on two great commanders" | 2006-11-22 |
| Roberts succeeds in writing a readable and engaging comparison of the perceptions each leader possessed toward the other. The history is not a portrait of each commander separately, but rather shows the relationship between the two men in terms of conduct and word.
While the history gives more or less equal time to both commanders, what emerges, at least in my view, is a decidedly surprising and uncommonly jaundiced portrayal of Wellington. For example, Wellington pursued and seduced no less than two of Napoleon's mistresses. He filled his mansion with copious quantities of "Napoleona" -- statues, paintings, memorabilia. Indeed, for a man of Wellington's supposedly Victorian understatement, he talked of his victory over Napoleon incessantly. It is typically understood that Napoleon was an egomaniacal, self-obsessed dictator. What is less well known is that Wellington was much less the reserved, stoic gentleman his reputation would lead one to believe. I would not consider this history to be essential reading except for buffs of the Napoleonic wars, and it gets a one-point deduction for its somewhat sordid, "tabloid-ish" quality. Still, I won't doubt the veracity of its content nor is it dry, so pick this one up if the focus is your cup of tea. | ||
 | ANYCOM HS-777 Bluetooth Headset | |
 | "You get what you pay for..." | 2006-11-21 |
| I bought this bluetooth headset because it was the cheapest one out there and I was reluctant to waste yet more money on another cell phone accessory. Within three days the joint between the ear clip and the rotating connector twisted loose, requiring the use of electrical tape to hold them together. The headset is bulky and doesn't fit my ear well, and the volume is barely loud enough to hear over the car on the highway with windows closed. Connection is mysteriously and frequently dropped, even though the headset isn't far enough away to technically lose the connection. Finally, the buttons are tiny, forcing you to fiddle with the headset to find the answer/dial button. It does mostly work and it is cheap, but that is about all I can say for it. On the whole, this headset is poorly designed ergonomically and is flimsily constructed. I would recommend paying a little more for a better headset, as I will be doing shortly. | ||
 | The Mask of Command | |
| "Engrossing and flawless" | 2006-06-02 |
| Prior to the publication of "The Face of Battle", much of military history focused on leaders and not on the led, set pieces and "macro" developments. With "The Mask of Command", Keegan returns from the raw shellshock of combat and furnishes four accounts of famous military leaders. However, his focus is not on strategic or tactical decisions, but on how these men led, the theatre and persona that these leaders cultivated to provide the trust and moral fiber which motivated their men. This is what Keegan means by "the mask" -- the image, the spirit, the incarnation of what subordinates needed to believe in order to fight. It is in some sense combative to claim that this persona is a "mask" -- that is, an artifice contrived to motivate and not strictly who these leaders "were". To some extent, it is impossible to know what any historical figure actually "was", or simply what we even "are", but in any event, these particular leaders had very interesting masks and Keegan does a superb job in each account. Clearly, if a leader is to be effective he must have the respect and trust of his men. The problem is that the mechanisms for gaining this respect are either fraught with personal peril, require the embodiment of a cause which is rarely stain-free, or rest upon a non-trivial ideological framework. The simplest starting point, then, is to answer Keegan's question, "In front: always, sometimes, or never". "In front" always has the advantage of pressing home the point to the men that the leader is bold, unafraid to assume the same risks as his men for a purpose in which he must clearly believe. "In front" also has the disadvantage of placing the leader in mortal danger. So a complication arises, namely, that good leaders are rare and precious, that losing them does a belligerent no good, but that to eschew personal risk is to court mistrust. Alexander, Keegan's first case study, chose "in front". He was able to do so in part because early warfare did not have the lethality of later warfare -- arrows rarely hit their mark and skill at arms could tell in the local heat of combat. Alexander could thus afford it, but he too felt it incumbent to act more and more heroically, i.e., to take increasingly greater risks the more he demanded of his men, finally risking too much and losing his life. Wellington opted for "sometimes", rushing about from regiment to regiment at Waterloo, courting stray musket balls and grapeshot at every turn, exhorting and directing at all times. Still, he did not lead from the front, which was probably a wise decision when impersonal bullets could kill men in swaths. Grant more-or-less chose "never", as did Hitler. The issue then arises for all leaders, but especially for those leaders who chose "never", to find other means of gaining trust and belief. Alexander would engage in dramatic antics, spending days in his tent in peevish anticipation of apology, and would don fabulous armor for engagements. Oration and rhetoric were vital to his success as he attempted to hearten at least a portion of his men. Wellington cultivated the persona of the stoic gentleman warrior, an iron will of perfection, fair to all but intolerant of sloppiness. Grant cultivated the image of being "one of the boys" -- surrounding himself with home-town friends, spurring his men by honestly showing them his hangdog vulnerability, and by relying on his men's belief in the justice of the Union cause - they were, after all, citizen-soldiers, volunteers, men of conviction. Hitler's leadership required the constant bolstering of a seductive ideology, endless infusions of propaganda. Belief in his command was cemented by the ceaseless exhortations of Goebbels. Like the uncreative and largely ineffective generals of WWI, Hitler hid in secret bunkers while his men died far away. That Hitler could get away with it for so long and so successfully was largely due to the dramatic improvements in communications, but also through the constant retelling of the Fuhrer's heroism in WWI. Ultimately, Hitler was not a hero, but a false god whose command withered with the monstrous dream of the Third Reich and his distance from the realities of the front. Here, Keegan does a particularly fine job detailing Hitler's neurotic infantilism, his growing separation from reality, his insecure sense of isolation, and his final ignominious demise. "The Mask of Command" is readable, compelling, and perhaps the most flawless of all of Keegan's histories. Quality, not quantity is the motto here. A brilliant and absorbing treatise. | ||
 | A History of Warfare | |
| "First-rate, despite some problems" | 2006-05-17 |
| "A History of Warfare" could easily be considered Keegan's best if it weren't for the comparable excellence of "The Face of Battle" and "The Mask of Command". Fluidly-written and compelling, Keegan manages to pack an uncanny amount of interest into every sentence. This is as close to being a page-turner that any history can hope for, and yet it also exhibits the erudition, information density and completeness that one demands from a professional historian. As might be expected, Keegan begins with prehistoric primitive warfare and concludes with nuclear arms. It seems at first blush a task impossibly broad in scope but the author manages to achieve superb pacing and balance. Between these two endpoints Keegan addresses the rationale for warfare as well as technology, tactics and strategy. It is enough to let the chapters speak for the structure, which divides into "War in Human History", "Stone", "Flesh", "Iron", and "Fire". Between each chapter is an "interlude" focusing respectively on limitations on warmaking, fortification, armies, and logistics and supply. While the organization of the history is logical, it should be noted that chapters are more-or-less chronological while the interludes are less so. The work does have some problems -- the most significant is that Keegan intends it as a polemic against Clausewitz. The author attempts to refute Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of policy by other means." The entire narrative is localized and situated around this polemic and the unfortunate result is a mild but periodically grating commentary which is both unnecessary and unconvincing. On the one hand, if, as Keegan asserts, Clausewitz assumed the existence of "states, and state interests" then the reader would not expect his famous dictum to apply to pre-state societies and the polemic would thus be gratuitous. On the other hand, if one believes it is vital to show that war is not a continuation of policy for pre-state societies, then other problems surface. The principal approach the polemic takes, then, is to show that not all warfare is motivated by policy. But if a war lacks a policy behind it then it must be waged for the sake of sheer bloodlust. In a modern society one can only look at the anomalous serial killer for demented pleasure in death, so it is hard to imagine it reproduced on a collective scale. For this reason it seems simplistic that a society would conduct a war for some carnal "joy of bloodletting". Perhaps then, a non-policy motivation would be vengeance. But is revenge not in some sense a policy, stated or unstated? Can one not argue that a code of vengeance exists to guarantee the expectation of response and so in effect deter aggression? Is it even accurate to assert that prehistoric cultures had no "policy" behind their conflicts? And what of modern societies -- is it correct to conclude that since (e.g.) the Cold War remained "cold" out of "fear" of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the Cold War was not an extension of policy but merely the result of "fear"? Moreover, even if Keegan's objection is valid in some pedantic sense -- where does it get us? Every war has different specific motivations, some highly complex, others instinctive and basic. Beyond its appeal to professional historians, is it at all important to lay-audiences to classify each war as policy-motivated or not? Judging by the conclusion, it seems Keegan's goal is to show that mankind is a teeming mass of violent degenerates, which, if not reformed soon, will inevitably ruin the planet with nuclear weapons. Whether such an admonition is novel, helpful or in any way illuminating is another matter. Clausewitz himself was in the process of revamping his views when he died, his last texts both a synthesis and correction of preceding ones. The reader might turn to Corbett's "Principles of Maritime Strategy" to get an alternative perspective on Clausewitz -- the Prussian's belief in peace through a premature intimation of MAD. And what really is the fascination with Clausewitz when his elevation of regiments to a structural requirement of social order was, in many respects, a legacy of the French Republic -- and was his "regimentalism" much worse than existing alternatives? On the whole, then, Keegan's history would be phenomenal without lowering itself, as it were, by engaging yesterday's policy wonk in mortal combat. At the same time it bears repeating that the history itself is, indeed, phenomenal. | ||
 | Blood of Revolution : From the Reign of Terror to the Rise of Khomeini | |
| "Worthwhile, despite some problems" | 2006-05-16 |
| The theme of Durschmied's history is fairly mundane and straightforward -- with the largely singular exception of the American Revolution, revolutions and "progressive" revolutionaries more often than not create leadership that is more brutal than the old order. One would think that this theme is a truism until one observes so many young supporters of e.g. Che, Lenin, or Castro, either out of sheer ignorance or willful denial. For this reason "Blood of Revolution" has redeeming value, especially since it is readable and overwhelmingly accurate. Durschmied covers, in order, The Jacobin Terror, The Mexican Revolution, The Russian Revolution, the Spartakus revolution of German socialists, the plot to assassinate Hitler, the plot to "save" Hirohito and forcibly prevent armistice, and the Iranian Revolution. In all cases he manages to maintain interest and make his case well. For example, Pancho Villa, whose revolutionary mystique made him a Hollywood darling, stopped a train of hundreds of Federales and massacred everyone on board, ordered the disappearance of entire village male populations and permitted rape of the women who remained, and lined up 400 Colorados three-deep to save precious bullets during execution. These are but a few from a vast litany of horrific acts perpetrated during most revolutions. The narrative is quite interesting, particularly the background to the Mexican and Iranian Revolutions. At times however, it seems Durschmied is at loss for a segue between episodes and attempts to link them with the rather awkward "And then...". Another problem is basic omission of worthy candidates for revolutionary terror. Instead of narrating the plot to assassinate Hitler by Colonel Stauffenberg, Durschmied would have done better to focus on the Nazi Party's rise and ultimate seizure of the Reichstag. Durschmied similarly ignores the rise and victory of Mao's Communists in China which resulted in the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps the most irritating of the flaws is the sometimes dubious historical analysis. For example, Durschmied contends that Wilson erred by interfering in the Mexican power struggle. Why? Because it provided Germany a political entry point from which to encourage Mexico to attack the US during WWI, thereby involving the US in the world conflict after the interception of the "Zimmerman Telegram". One would think, judging from his reasoning, that Durschmied must think it a bad thing for the US to have entered WWI, when on the contrary it encouraged a speedier armistice and saved the allies. It still could be the case that US interference in Mexico was counter-productive, but not for the simplistic and basically wrong-headed rationale given by the author. Despite these problems, "The Blood of Revolution" is a worthwhile and often gripping account of revolutionary terror from a good sampling of revolutions. Not only accurate but a good read, Durschmied's account is the perfect gift for today's misty-eyed radical in his Che Guevara t-shirt. | ||
 | Principles of Maritime Strategy | |
| "Essential Military History" | 2006-05-15 |
| First published in 1911, "Principles of Maritime Strategy" is an under-appreciated history that is quite readable and one of the first post-Clausewitzian forays into what can be considered modern strategic analysis. Corbett diverges from most predecessors by viewing naval strategy in the larger context of indirect pressure on both military and economic assets of the adversary. Traditionally, a combatant's goal was to reach a decisive engagement between the lion's share of both fleets. In practice, this type of engagement is rarely possible and only desirable (highly-so) for the stronger side. If a decisive engagement was not possible, then the received wisdom was that naval forces were subservient to land forces, under the beck-and-call of the army to transport units. While these are certainly services that a modern navy provides, they have become secondary to more important roles. The goal of much of modern naval warfare is often simplistically left at "command of the sea". The problem is that "command of the sea" is not always clear, and that the notion itself is often accompanied by the erroneous "assumption that if one belligerent loses command of the sea, it passes at once to the other belligerent.[87]" Corbett shows that wars can be won by the side with the weaker local force if that navy can maintain maneuvering space, choose location, probe weaknesses and isolate vulnerable targets. A belligerent can be effective if he merely contests command of the sea. What, in fact, is "command of the sea"? Its purpose is to exert pressure on the enemy's trade and control both his military and political lines of communication. However, one does not necessarily require a free hand to contest them. If land forces are in a stalemate then naval disruption of supply and communication can tilt the balance. Especially nice is Corbett's view of naval tactics on an abstract level -- less emphasis is placed on the the romantic battle and much more is placed on distribution of force -- that is, "concentration". It is often in practice a significant liability to consolidate forces into a mother fleet. Better is to optimize dispersal in such a manner that a navy can reposition as much force as necessary to a problem location in the requisite amount of time. This optimization of layout and selection of units can be highly complex, depending not only on numbers but on ship speed, communication technology, firepower, coastline, typical weather patterns, and the extent to which the flotilla is armed. Indeed, the role of the flotilla and the role of cruisers is another important theme. As the flotilla became more comprehensive and capable of self-defense, engagements and attacks on supply became more complicated. Similarly, Corbett documents a decreasing importance of big ships of the line, accompanied by a corresponding reliance on cruisers. Able to move quickly and consolidate rapidly, cruisers better conformed to the requirements of modern maritime strategy. Oddly, Britain seemed to ignore Corbett's advice (and the trend) during her naval buildup prior to WWI. Her Majesty blithely focused on building dreadnoughts -- extremely expensive battleships that actually became defensive liabilities which discouraged engagement, being as they were too dear to deploy. Perhaps the most refreshing aspect of the work, however, is Corbett's introduction to the much-maligned and misunderstood Clausewitz. Corbett contends that Clausewitz is correct in his assertion that "war is the continuation of policy by other means", especially from a naval perspective, where the goal is often pressure and not victory, influence rather than control. Even better is Corbett's clarification of what Clausewitz meant by "true war" and "real war". Rather than being the "father of WWI", Clausewitz predicted an era of peace because true war would be so devastatingly complete that no side would engage in it. In other words, Clausewitz more-or-less formulated the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction, but in an era where nuclear weapons were unavailable, Clausewitz erred by assuming that mankind would be deterred by the totality of 19th-century warfare. Corbett's treatise is short and readable, referencing numerous past engagements to bolster analysis. It should be read by all those interested in military history and strategy. | ||
 | Thailand: A Short History | |
| "Readable and well-done" | 2006-03-23 |
| It is, of course, impossible to cover every aspect of a nation's history to everyone's satisfaction in a single volume, or in any series of volumes for that matter. My expectation of Wyatt's effort was that it would narrate the origins and development of the Tai and Thailand on a general level. Wyatt did an admirable job of fullfilling my expectations. For those who bother to read prefaces, the author begs forgiveness from other scholars who would balk at the necessary incompleteness such an outline implictly entails. Wyatt's history focuses predominantly on the rise and fall of various Tai states from the influence of early Nan-Chao to modern Thailand's awkward internal pressures of democracy, authoritarianism, tradition and reform. He deals primarily with top-level political contests -- successions to the throne, conflicts between the Tai, Shan, Mon, Burmese, Khmer, and Lao ethnic civilizations, the pyramidal control structures typical of various Tai empires, and so on. What emerges then is a reliable gestalt of how Tai history unfolded from the earliest days to the present. I found Wyatt's history to be sufficiently readable and engaging. One problem is the sometimes tedious litany of dynastic struggles and successions. Also regrettably absent is a more involved elucidation of the specific nature of Tai Buddhism beyond its broad political roles in Tai history. "Thailand: A Short History" is ultimately more a political, material, and especially, a territorial history and somewhat less a cultural one. However, without Wyatt's effort most of us would need to settle for no familiarity with Tai history whatsoever. The author is to be applauded not only for his erudition and high-quality writing, but for enduring the anguish of omission that a short history necessarily demands. | ||
 | Medieval Civilization, 400-1500 | |
| "Illuminating, advanced history" | 2005-11-29 |
| Medieval Civilization is not an introductory history of the Middle Ages. The author assumes prior knowledge of many details. For those of us who are not up-to-speed, frequent use of an online encyclopedia is a must. Ever hear of the "Chanson de Geste"? How about the "Carolingian dynasty"? Le Goff doesn't tell you what these actually are -- but Wikipedia does. If you already have a grounding in medieval history, or if you are willing to go the extra mile, Le Goff's work is engaging and quite readable. The author does not proceed chronologically, but rather sweeps up and down the time period, highlighting important trends and big-picture concepts. It is in this erudite generalization that the real strength of the work emerges. For example, Le Goff observes that in medieval epistemology, to understand something was to name it. The symbol itself was the essence of an object or the mechanics of a process. Thus, grammar and language were the most studied of all subjects, the most fundamental tools for knowing creation. By making chronology subservient to theme, Le Goff is able to provide an illuminating snapshot of the Middle Ages as a whole. The downside of doing this is that the reader is left with more of a gestalt comprehension rather than a precisely located sense of time and place. That the downside is only minor is a testament to the interest and appeal of Le Goff's ideas. | ||
 | D-Day: The Greatest Invasion - A People's History | |
| "Informative and moving tribute to the "Greatest Generation"" | 2005-11-15 |
| In May 1945, Van der Vat's hometown of Alkmaar in North Holland was finally liberated by allied troops. With "The Greatest Invasion", the author expresses his undying gratitude to the sacrifices of these men, attempting to return the favor, as best as he can, for the salvation from Hitler's jackboot. In particular, Van der Vat doesn't gloss over the role of Canadian troops at Juno Beach -- the ones who specifically went on to liberate his birthplace.
The result is a moving tribute that captures the tremendous undertaking of D-Day while eschewing overly somber tones. The text is richly informative as are the fine diagrams which accompany it. Van der Vat presents stirring letters and anecdotes from a host of representative participants as well as high-level tactical descriptions of the invasion. Of course, the photos are not only stunning, but the modern ones are originals intended for the book. These are not stock photographs. They include before-and-after shots of locations, perspective shots from inside German pillboxes, or panoramas from the cliffs. Snapshots of memorabilia, insignia, and documents are also thoughtfully provided. Finally, the graphic design and layout of the book are superb. A very fine effort sure to reward any reader interested in history. | ||
 | The Nine Numbers of the Cosmos | |
| "Still mostly relevant, still excellent" | 2005-11-06 |
| Nine Numbers is similar to the later work by Martin Rees ("Just Six Numbers") in its approach to a popular work on cosmology. Rowan-Robinson looks at nine cosmological numbers that are so crucial to our understanding that if altered but little would make our existence impossible. While the work is dated (1999), those aspects are primarily cosmetic (exact value of constants, exact age of the universe, etc.) The key concepts are mostly applicable today, to the best of my knowledge. Those concepts that are radically different in 2006 are still so cutting edge that we can't be confident about them anyway. While we can only hope that the author updates Nine Numbers, it would be a shame to reject this fine book because it doesn't cover Dark Energy, the latest kinks in String Theory or the Holographic Universe. Rowan-Robinson is unique among cosmology writers in that he does not eschew a bit of technical dirty-work. Readers should be comfortable with graphs, charts, trends, logarithms, and orders of magnitude. At the same time, the work is not so technical that most readers couldn't grasp it. Especially refreshing is the author's excellent writing -- very fluid, yet direct and unflambuoyant. Nine Numbers is an unassuming work that offers a rich trove of insight. If you are looking for another cosmology book to read at a bargain price, consider this one. | ||
 | A Random Walk Down Wall Street: Completely Revised and Updated Eighth Edition | |
| "Destroys "technical analysis"" | 2005-10-31 |
| A Random Walk needs to be the first book you read about the stock market. Malkiel is best known as a proponent of efficient markets -- the idea that stocks are correctly valued. If everyone believed that a stock was undervalued or overvalued, investors would act accordingly and en masse to correct the price. This is a fundamental tenet of the stock market that all investors must internalize before they invest. The stock market suffers from the economic version of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle -- any belief in a given strategy alters the market itself. This is not to say that Malkiel doesn't believe that stocks can at times be incorrectly valued. The point is that one needs knowledge of a given industry to take advantage of it. For example, if you work in the oil industry and understand drilling techniques in great detail, you could exploit this knowledge. Malkiel goes on to thoroughly destroy the holy grail of Wall Street mavens: technical analysis. This form of analysis is based on the idea that past performance can predict future success based solely on the chart of the stock. In fact, such analysts are often called "chartists". Any one of hundreds of mathematical techniques exist that examine chart behavior -- Bollinger Bands, moving averages, Cup-and-Handle, and so on. All of them are more-or-less totally worthless, since they suffer from the uncertainty principle described above. Malkiel provides damning statistics that show beyond doubt that chartists do not consistently outperform a team of monkeys tossing darts at a board. The key adverb here is "consistently". Malkiel acknowledges that proponents of one or another strategy could show streaks of success -- but that is all they are: streaks. If 1000 people flip a coin ten times, there will be some flippers who flip heads 9/10 times. The same holds for money managers. Finally, Malkiel examines momentum investing of the type advocated by Keynes, otherwise known as the "Greater Fool Theory". The idea here is that investors can buy an overvalued, overhyped stock and sell it to an even bigger buffoon, who in turn does the same, until eventually somebody is left holding the bag. Malkiel tells the tale of the Tulip Craze in Holland, circa 1630. Tulips became the source of intense speculation, reaching astronomical prices. Eventually, people realized they were holding a bunch of plant bulbs, and the market crashed. The key here is knowing when to sell so that there is a greater fool available to buy your shares. Therein lies the rub -- there is no rational way to make that prediction. Those who did well in the late 1990s tech bubble made money using the greater fool approach. Similarly, millions of investors got creamed in the 1990s because they were the greatest fools. Random Walk is a seminal work on investing that is not only eminently true, but well-written and entertaining. Don't be the greatest fool. Read this book. | ||
 | Nova - The Elegant Universe | |
| "Buy this with Barney the Dinosaur and save!" | 2005-10-25 |
| As a big fan of Brian Greene -- having read both The Elegant Universe and The Fabric of the Cosmos, I thought the DVD would help cement and retain ideas in the book. In fact, there is little if any content. There are, however, lots of pointless, flashy effects that convey no understanding. Lots of cool sound effects, too. Professor Greene jumps through walls and disappears with lots of swooshing noises. Toddlers will be mystified and enchanted by this. It really beats the mobile spinning over the crib. | ||
 | Six Days of War : June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East | |
| "A tour de force" | 2005-10-23 |
| Six Days of War is exceptional because it focuses less on detailed military engagements and almost entirely on the diplomatic/strategic maneuvering. Oren uses recently declassified material to narrate the harrowing conflict. He covers the pressures exerted by superpower interests, political dealmaking, and personal conversations between major players. From the standpoint of strict military history, Oren concerns himself with top-level events: the Arab "Big Lie" of victory, widespread deceptions by Nasser's lieutenants, Israeli hesitations to strike (the unforgettable image of Rabin chain-smoking comes to mind). Oren then goes on to tie the repercussions of the conflict to the current political map of the Middle East. Six Days of War is history at its finest and should be read by anyone interested in the modern Middle East. | ||
 | The Prophet and the Astronomer: A Scientific Journey to the End of Time | |
 | "Readable cosmology book, unsatisfying thesis" | 2005-10-22 |
| The Prophet and the Astronomer attempts as its goal to connect historically religious attitudes toward the heavens with the modern cosmological implications for spiritual identity. Both are different facets of the same quest for meaning that man has undertaken since ancient times. Unfortunately, the thesis more-or-less devolves into "Ancients used to think that comets were harbingers of doom. Today we know they are balls of ice and rock hurtling around the solar system." Not very illuminating. What Gleiser does do well -- but not nearly as well as numerous other authors -- is describe principles and developments of modern cosmology to popular audiences. For this, however, the reader would do much better to turn to Brian Greene, Martin Rees, or Hawking (to name a few). | ||
 | The Prophet and the Astronomer | |
| "Readable cosmology book, unsatisfying thesis" | 2005-10-22 |
| The Prophet and the Astronomer attempts as its goal to connect historically religious attitudes toward the heavens with the modern cosmological implications for spiritual identity. Both are different facets of the same quest for meaning that man has undertaken since ancient times. Unfortunately, the thesis more-or-less devolves into "Ancients used to think that comets were harbingers of doom. Today we know they are balls of ice and rock hurtling around the solar system." Not very illuminating. What Gleiser does do well -- but not nearly as well as numerous other authors -- is describe principles and developments of modern cosmology to popular audiences. For this, however, the reader would do much better to turn to Brian Greene, Martin Rees, or Hawking (to name a few). | ||
 | Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War | |
| "Fascinating, important history" | 2005-10-21 |
| Readers who demand a complete and meticulous history of Soviet submarine warfare should join the CIA. For the rest of us who cannot or will not join the CIA, Rising Tide comes as close as possible to describing the Soviet sub program -- the maneuvers of her vessels, conflicts with American boats, strategies, technologies, and the political tit-for-tat that accompanied it all. As a bonus, Rising Tide sports an appendix containing an itemization of Soviet boats replete with tonnage, diving depth, length and special features. Particularly heartbreaking was the account of the nuclearization of the Soviet navy, her transition to reactor power. For example, the Soviets inserted two reactors into most boats -- before they were fully developed. The result was repeated volunteer suicide missions by crew members to turn off overheating reactor cores and leaking cooling pipes. Also interesting is the account of Soviet technological progress in shipbuilding. From early diesel-powered jalopies, the Soviets managed to produce, in 1977 (initial design, 1957), a reactor-powered Alfa-class boat, made entirely of Titanium, that could dive to 800m at 40 knots. The boats were all still intolerably hot and sweaty in warmer climates, until Typhoon and Akula class boats appeared with warheads and nuclear-armed torpedoes. Beyond the edifying history, however, Rising Tide breaks down the last Cold War barriers of mistrust and ignorance, finally documenting the heroism and ingenuity of honest sailors who, trapped by a history never in their control, fought steadfastly for a dying and unworthy ideology. | ||
 | The Case For Democracy | |
| "Eminently reasonable" | 2005-10-19 |
| Amidst the deafening rancor of moral equivalency and paralyzing relativism, Sharansky sounds the clarion call to moral clarity. The Case for Democracy shows in stark relief the lasting negative consequences of realpolitik that accelerated under Kissinger and didn't slow until Reagan put his foot down. Sharanksy contends that appeasement of oppressive governments to further policy goals is a dubious practice inherently incapable of achieving lasting benefits. Authoritarian regimes do not enjoy the natural support of constituents, and so require external enemies to distract their restive populations. When these marriages of convenience inevitably break up, the external enemy becomes the democratic nation that appeased them in the first place. Sharanksy offers a solution based on his experience as a Soviet dissident: democracies need to link support for other nations to their treatment of their citizens. Such was the case when Reagan proceeded to enforce the human rights clauses of the Helsinki accords. Sharanksy distinguishes between fear societies and free societies and suggests a "park test" to evaluate the difference. If you can say whatever you wish in a public square and not be persecuted, you live in a free society. Significantly, members of a fear society yearn for its reform. Reagan's pressure on the Soviets resulted in greater openness which bolstered dramatically the native striving for freedom in the USSR. In contrast, Sharanksy presents examples of bad foreign policy. Israel's support for Arafat in the Oslo accords was based on the cynical premise that only a popular dictator could enforce the conditions of a settlement. This resulted in Arafat's incitement of the intifada at the first opportunity. Similarly, in our haste to counter the looming threat of a fundamentalist Iran after the hostage crisis, we supported a secular dictator and newcomer -- Saddam. Today, the results of that decision are plain. Sharansky's detractors will waste no time in raising the specter of neo-conservative bogeymen in the White House conspiring to support him. They would introduce unhelpful phrases such as "partial democracy". One can only hope that his detractors visit these partial democracies and decry the leadership there. It would be an interesting experiment to mosey into Pakistan and browbeat Musharraf in a public square, or lambast Hamas at the annual terrorist picnic. Detractors will offer ersatz apologies for fear societies, e.g., Palestinians -- recipients of more per-capita foreign aid than any other group in modern history -- are poor, and thus cannot achieve freedom. No two democracies have ever waged war against each other - a rock-solid observation that does not include "partial democracies" or, as it were, "partial fear" societies. Only by encouraging freedom and reform in repressive societies, Sharansky shows, can long term security be achieved for democratic nations. The Case for Democracy deserves all the accolades it has received. | ||
 | A History of Pi | |
| "History of Pi, History of Progress" | 2005-10-18 |
| "When did Pi make progress, and when did it not?" asks Beckman. From this simple question the author explores not only the history of Pi, but the history of successful and failed civilizations, cultures, and governments where Pi played a role. Rome, for example, primarily relied on 22/7 as a useful engineering approximation, and left it at that, despite the elegant proofs and algorithms developed by her predecessors. To paraphrase Beckman, "In healthy societies, technology and art become increasingly smaller and clever. In totalitarian regimes, everything simply gets bigger." Rome, the quintessential totalitarian regime, paralleled Soviet society with her fetish for the gaudy, grotesque, and gargantuan. The author recalls archeologists who unearthed what they thought was a Roman temple (judging by the statues), only to realize it was a commode. Fast-forward, and one sees the massive busts of Lenin in St. Petersburg's similarly gargantuan subway system. Beckman takes us from the Egyptians to the Babylonians to the Greeks to Alexandria to the Middle Ages, to Pascal, to Gauss, and so on to supercomputers. He shows Greek attempts to square the circle, later approximations of Pi using trigonometric and geometric infinite series, and much more. Throughout, the author presents us with a riotous and brutal roast of history along with a rich, technical story of Pi that should prove challenging to most readers. | ||
 | The Second World War | |
| "Essential History of WWII" | 2005-10-16 |
| John Keegan has managed to accomplish what others could not -- write a sound, objective history of WWII, constrained to one volume, in a gripping, compelling manner. If you have never read a history of the second world war -- this is the only place to start. Keegan provides a clear conceptual framework for assimilating the scale and scope of the conflict. The Pacific Theatre, Africa, the Battle of Britain, the Eastern Front and of course, the War in the Atlantic. As with all of Keegan's histories, he attempts to balance multiple perspectives without giving excessive time to any one of them. Some war histories are "tales from the trenches", or present the arch-typical "generals view", or focus strictly on military details, or ignore military details and consider diplomatic/political motivations. Keegan presents all of these, with a cornucopia of facts laced together seamlessly and professionally. Kudos to the internationally-esteemed professor from Britain's Sandhurst Academy. No reader will walk away disappointed. | ||
 | The Rise and Fall of an American Army: U.S. Ground Forces, Vietnam, 1965-1973 | |
| "A valuable history" | 2005-10-16 |
| The Vietnam War is probably the most maligned, misunderstood, misrepresented, and misreported conflict in military history. Readers who wish to clear their minds of the perpetual cacophony of nonsense surrounding it must turn to a qualified source. Shelby Stanton -- military historian and decorated veteran, Infantry Officer, Ranger, Airborne, and Special Forces in Vietnam, is a qualified source. Stanton turns his untinted glasses to the conflict in a very scholarly, soldierly manner. The history is primarily engagement-oriented, but weaves these engagements into a backdrop of policy, system-wide challenges, political fiascos, and cultural difficulties. Stanton covers every major engagement during the war with as much precision as possible for a single volume. He meticulously lists regiments, battalions, companies, squads, etc. before he commences a vivid description of combat. Particularly critical actions by individuals are also mentioned. The author does not whitewash low points in military conduct. He discusses the poorly-led Americal division, members of which were responsible for My Lai. Substance abuse by soldiers (particularly toward the latter end of the conflict), demoralization and insubordination prior to demobilization and cover-ups in the chain-of-command all receive treatment. However, Stanton places these problems in perspective and is, above all, fair to the men who served. The simple fact is that the vast, overwhelming majority of troops served honorably, steadfastly and often heroically. In almost no circumstance where the NVA/VC able to hold captured targets for any length of time, and only rarely were they able to overwhelm an entire position. Casualties experienced by the NVA, as best as can be ascertained, outnumbered ours dramatically (a figure given is 500,000 NVA/VC, by an NVA general to journalist Oriana Fallaci). In fact, the use of casualties as a benchmark for successful engagements was one of the problems that (Stanton points out) led to My Lai. Other benchmarks were hard to come by, however, given the "Total War" strategy that deemphasized holding strategic terrain. Ultimately, the failure to achieve policy objectives in Vietnam rested with political decisions and lack of American will. From a tactical perspective, US Forces on the whole performed admirably -- repulsing Tet and Mini-Tet, winning the "Big Battles" of 1967, and so on. Rise and Fall is well-written and manages to engage the reader despite the precision. It contains numerous maps by the author as well as illuminating photographs from his collection. A history that will stand the test of time. | ||
 | A History of Britain: The Fate of Empire 1776-2000 | |
| "Bloody good stuff" | 2005-10-16 |
| A single-volume history of Britain from 1776-2000 -- tall order. Schama's history primarily addresses intellectual and political trends, inequality at home and abroad, whatever happens to be festering in his brain on any given day in front of the word processor, and, of course, the perpetually complex relationship the British seem to have with their soil. Literally. Schama tells us of a Tory agricultural wizard obsessed with "manuring" the countryside (if only the tenant farmers would cooperate). My parochial American upbringing probably explains why I had no idea that "manure" is also a verb. The land and its mythology returns again and again, as the Back to Nature movement romanticizes primitive Britain, the rustic origins of the noble Anglo. These intrepid blokes joined the common man in actually walking around the countryside, much to the chagrin of their more refined equals. Rousseau, always one french fry short of a Happy Meal, is welcomed as a celebrity until he turns on the puffy, rich sponsors who bought him his country cabin. And so it goes, in a similar vein, throughout. Schama walks us through the ripple effects of the French Revolution, the political sources of the Irish Famine, Queen Victoria's lasting impact on her society, and the noble British enlightenment of India (achieved, in part, by selling India-grown opium to the Chinese, who balked and thus compelled tough love from Her Majesty). I won't spoil it for you, but a final item the reader can look forward to: Schama treats us to nothing less than a "celebrity roast" of every single Prime Minister. Yes, that Simon fellow hates 'em all. And he likes George Orwell (a chap with true grit)... and... oh, just read it (that's "read" -- don't watch it on the telly). | ||
 | The Rise and Fall of an American Army : U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965-1973 | |
| "A valuable history" | 2005-10-16 |
| The Vietnam War is probably the most maligned, misunderstood, misrepresented, and misreported conflict in military history. Readers who wish to clear their minds of the perpetual cacophony of nonsense surrounding it must turn to a qualified source. Shelby Stanton -- military historian and decorated veteran, Infantry Officer, Ranger, Airborne, and Special Forces in Vietnam, is a qualified source. Stanton turns his untinted glasses to the conflict in a very scholarly, soldierly manner. The history is primarily engagement-oriented, but weaves these engagements into a backdrop of policy, system-wide challenges, political fiascos, and cultural difficulties. Stanton covers every major engagement during the war with as much precision as possible for a single volume. He meticulously lists regiments, battalions, companies, squads, etc. before he commences a vivid description of combat. Particularly critical actions by individuals are also mentioned. The author does not whitewash low points in military conduct. He discusses the poorly-led Americal division, members of which were responsible for My Lai. Substance abuse by soldiers (particularly toward the latter end of the conflict), demoralization and insubordination prior to demobilization and cover-ups in the chain-of-command all receive treatment. However, Stanton places these problems in perspective and is, above all, fair to the men who served. The simple fact is that the vast, overwhelming majority of troops served honorably, steadfastly and often heroically. In almost no circumstance where the NVA/VC able to hold captured targets for any length of time, and only rarely were they able to overwhelm an entire position. Casualties experienced by the NVA, as best as can be ascertained, outnumbered ours dramatically (a figure given is 500,000 NVA/VC, by an NVA general to journalist Oriana Fallaci). In fact, the use of casualties as a benchmark for successful engagements was one of the problems that (Stanton points out) led to My Lai. Other benchmarks were hard to come by, however, given the "Total War" strategy that deemphasized holding strategic terrain. Ultimately, the failure to achieve policy objectives in Vietnam rested with political decisions and lack of American will. From a tactical perspective, US Forces on the whole performed admirably -- repulsing Tet and Mini-Tet, winning the "Big Battles" of 1967, and so on. Rise and Fall is well-written and manages to engage the reader despite the precision. It contains numerous maps by the author as well as illuminating photographs from his collection. A history that will stand the test of time. | ||
 | Long Day's Journey Into War: Pearl Harbor and a World at War-December 7, 1941 | |
| "Innovative, moving history" | 2005-10-15 |
| As has often been observed, to write history is to choose. Similarly, to read history is to choose. Should we read a history covering thousands of years, or a history limited to a single historical actor, or the annals of a single campaign, and so on? With Long Day's Journey into War, Weintraub contributes a valuable innovation to historical writing. The history covers a brief period -- December 7, 1941 -- the 48 hours that it takes for the earth to complete a single date. During this time, Weintraub assembles a seamlessly woven montage from all parts of the globe as they experience the preceding tensions and subsequent ripple effects of Pearl Harbor. Cairo, Moscow, Washington, Pearl, Hong Kong, Tokyo, London and other key locations. Weintraub includes anecdotes from "lowly" privates running for cover, to worried diplomats, to America First isolationists, to a certain overrated general, to presidents and prime ministers. The overall effect is successful and powerful. The reader becomes immersed and rooted in time and place, emerging with a sense of having experienced the fateful day on a global scale. A splendid and unique history worthy of any bookshelf. | ||
 | The Codebreakers : The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet | |
| "Required reading" | 2005-10-14 |
| Kahn's inspired account of codebreaking and cryptanalysis from ancient to modern is a must read for anybody who wishes to understand history, technology, warfare -- nearly every facet of life which depends on encrypted communications and their vulnerability. His gripping narrative will suck you in and hold you until the last page. The Codebreakers is accessible to the lay reader without skimping on broad technical fundamentals. While cryptography is an oft written-about topic today, Kahn's enduring masterpiece is the ne plus ultra to which all others aspire. | ||
 | Fields of Battle : The Wars for North America | |
| "Excellent, but not standard Keegan" | 2005-10-14 |
| Readers who have never had the privilege and good fortune to read John Keegan's histories should probably start with other works by the author. Fields of Battle covers notable conflicts on North American shores, beginning with the colonization of Canada by the French, and moving on to the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and conflicts with the Indians. What makes Fields of Battle special, however, is that it is a profoundly personal journey by the author across battlegrounds and historic locations throughout the United States. Keegan employs his extensive traveling and historical erudition to explore his own spiritual and cultural identity -- that of British historian in love with America. In bringing his own complex perspective as a "foreigner" to our shores, Keegan shows us what we didn't know about ourselves. Keegan's account of conflicts with Native Americans is relatively uncharitable to them. Readers who are accustomed to simplistic, typically Leftist whitewashings of the often stark brutality and recalcitrance of Indian tribes will find this history distinctly unpalatable. To his credit, Keegan does not shy away from describing American mistakes, but holds the perspective that there always was, is, and should be room in North America for both populations. Finally, to readers insufficiently acquainted with the author's other writing to give him the respect he merits, Fields of Battle may come off as excessively sentimental and wistful. For those not in that group, Fields of Battle is yet another history by the preeminent John Keegan to savor and add to your book case. | ||
 | The Man Who Broke Napoleon's Codes | |
| "Phenomenal" | 2005-10-13 |
| Urban's history is at once a sound history and a suspenseful, compelling read. The author documents the achievements of George Scovell, one-time apprentice to an engraver, who rose through the ranks of Wellington's Army to be responsible -- no-less than more famous actors -- for the British victory over Napoleon. While the history examines Scovell's masterful feat of ingenuity, it also narrates the events and context of military engagements throughout the campaign. This underappreciated gem gets an enthusiastic five stars. | ||
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